JUDICIAL REGULATION OF RATES OF WAGE FOR WOMEN by BROWN, W. JETHRO
JUDICIAL REGULATION OF RATES OF WAGE FOR
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W. JErHRO BROWN
President of the Industrial Court, South Australia
Probably no problem of industrial regulation is of more immediate
importance than the question of the rates of wage for women. It
has been my fortune, or misfortune, to deal with the question
judicially in the Industrial Court of the State of South Australia.2
The present article is based upon my judgment in that case. I felt,
and I still feel, that it was desirable to explain what appeared to me
the fundamental principles which should guide an Industrial Court
in dealing with a subject which is of growing importance, involves
manifold issues, and affects the interests of all classes of the
community. So far as I am aware, the subject has not previously
received judicial consideration in other countries. It has on various
occasions come before Industrial Courts in Australia; and certain
definite principles may be found in the brochure by Mr. Justice
Higgins on A New Province for Law and Order. The principles in
question are as follows --
(i) "The principle of the living wage has been applied to women,
but with a difference, as women are not usually legally responsible for
the maintenance of a family. A woman's minimum is based on the
average cost of her own living to one who supports herself by her own
exertions. A woman or girl with a comfortable home cannot be left
to underbid in wages other women or girls who are less fortunate.
(2) "But in an occupation in which men as well as women are
employed, the minimum is based on a man's cost of living. If the
occupation is that of a blacksmith, the minimum is a man's minimum;
if the occupation is that of a milliner, the minimum is a woman's mini-
mum; in the occupation of fruit-picking, as both men and women are
,enployed, the minimum must be a man's minimum."
I hope I may say without presumption that there is much that right
be justly urged in support of these principles, apart from the authority
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which properly attaches to them as declaratory of the policy of the
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. In particular,
their clearness, and the comparative ease of their application to par-
ticular industries, must appeal to a Judge of an Industrial Court. But,
in the recent case the far-reaching importance of the subject imposed
upon me the necessity of an analysis of the principles with a view to
considering the propriety of their adoption by this Court. I defer any
remarks which may appear to me pertinent to the first of the principles
affirmed by the learned Judge until I come to deal with the statutory
definition of the living wage as stated in the South Australian Industrial
Arbitration Act of 1912. The second principle suggests a partial
recognition of the alluring doctrine of equal pay for equal work. But I
am more inclined to regard it as merely a rule of expediency designed
to protect men from unfair competition in the labor market. Indeed, if
we were to accept the "equal pay for equal work" doctrine, it is hard to
say why the minimum wage for all unskilled women workers should
not be the same, or approximately the same, as that for unskilled men.
Women, who are unskilled workers, may naturally ask why their rate
of wage should depend upon the accident of men happening to be
employed in the same industry. Certainly some women to-day ask why
the wages of women should not be assessed from the point of view of
effort expended irrespective of whether women do or do not compete
with men for employment. Other women take a more definite stand,
and urge the award of equal pay for equal work in value. Such modes
of assessment, however, have not been generally adopted by Industrial
Courts. What is the explanation? One answer is that, however theo-
retically desirable, it is practically impossible for a mere human being
to fix wages by reference to the value of work done. The impossibility
is especially apparent in cases of mental work, because of its infinite
variety. Milton, if I remember rightly, obtained 15 for the manu-
script of Paradise Lost. It has been said that an American scientist,
working at a fixed salary, made among many other discoveries, one
discovery which increased the value of the potato crop of the United
States by the amount of ;2,000,000 per annum. While the remunera-
tions received in the cases mentioned were obviously capricious, and
suggest that the question of value of work done ought not to be wholly
ignored, it remains true that an Industrial Court which should set
out to fix the minimum wage for unskilled labor by reference to the
value of the work done, would be soon lost in a sea of fallacy and con-
tradiction. Even an employer in a particular business would be
generally unable to assess in terms of money the values of particular
workers, though he might be able to say what the total wages bill ought
to be if his business is to prove a paying proposition. As far as un-
skilled labor is concerned, an Industrial Judge is naturally driven to
adopt the standard of the needs of the worker-a standard which leads
to different results as regards men and women. The man, and not the
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woman, is typically the bread-winner of a family. In the case recently
before me Sir Josiah Symon, K. C., in his learned argument on behalf
of women worker's, urged that the wage for men was a personal and
not a family wage. He contended that the possibility that a man might
have a family to support, though a possibility, did not affect the essen-
tially personal character of the wage. He was unable to do more than
acquiesce in my suggestion that his argument led to the conclusion that
marriage was a calamity, which, like sickness, disease, or sudden death,
might happen to any man! I am quite unable to accept the learned
counsel's argument I look upon the maintenance of home life as of
supreme importance to the community. I regard the wage paid to the
adult male as essentially and in substance a family wage. True, so
far as single men are concerned, it has long been settled in Australia
that the minimum (living) wage should not be less than that of the
married man. In other words, in discussing the needs of the male
worker, a man with a family to support has been taken as the basis
of assessment. Any other conclusion would prejudice the married man
in search of employment, would tend to produce sterility of the popu-
lation, and would place the Industrial Court in thd invidious position
of fixing wages at a rate which would make it difficult, if not impos-
sible, for single men to save something for the time when they may
have the felicity to become supporters of a family. Of course, some
men never marry, and, in their case, the application of the doctrine
of equal pay for equal work produces results which might be rectified
by some such device as the bachelor tax. But many of the reasons
which apply in support of the doctrine of equal pay for. equal work
as applied to men (whether married or single) do not apply to em-
ployees (male or female). When women marry, they do so, I will not
say with the object, but I may say with the contemplation, of being
supported. As Mr. Justice Cussen says: "The ordinary wife and
mother has fortunately other duties to perform, the value of which
is not assessable by determination."3  There is another reason for
liniting the doctrine of equal pay for equal work to men, and that is the
probability that a larger proportion of single men than of single women
have to support parents or other relatives. In the net result, the
abstract doctrine of equal pay for equal work, despite its plausibility,
-must, in a world full of complexities and imperfections, yield to
considerations of practical expediency. As I have pointed out, carried
to its logical conclusion, the doctrine implies that all women who work
for their livelihood should be paid a wage assessed by reference to the
value of the work done, and irrespective of the traditional social
structure which imposes on men the duty of maintaining the home.
"Can one justify levelling up woman's wages to men's in trades where
they both work, while keeping them on an altogether lower scale in
Sig Argus L. Rep. 147.
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wholly feminine trades of equivalent difficulty?" asks Eleanor
Rathbone.' The plain, if regrettable, fact is that the determination of
rates of wage according to the value of the work done is only possible
in one or other limited senses. For example, in assessments of the
living wage, although the standard of assessment be the reasonable
needs of the workers, an Industrial Court cannot properly interpret the
elastic expression "reasonable needs" without some reference to the
value of the workers as measured by the wealth of the community, its
total output, etc.5 Further, it may be possible for a Court to say that
if a laborer in grade "X" receives £3 per week, the laborer in grade "Y"
should receive £3 plus or minus some specified amount. But that is not
to say that the value of the work of the laborer in grade "X" is or is not
£3 per week-either from the point of view of the employer or that of
the community. In the course of the hearing of the recent case, I
asked the learned counsel for the employees to distinguish between the
value of the services of the navvy on the road and those of the cook
in the home. As the learned counsel was precluded, by the nature of
the employees' log, from appealing to supply and demand, he had to
avow his inability to distinguish between the values. I proceeded to
point out that, assuming, for the sake of argument, that the services
were of equal value, it would follow that the cook should receive 36s.
6d. a week (allowing 17s. 6d. for board and residence) as an absolute
bed-rock level. As a matter of fact, since cooking is (or at least
ought to be) a skilled occupation, the wage to the cook, accepting the
test of the value of work done, and allowing for marginal differences,
should be between £2 and £3 per week. On various grounds I am
drawn to the conclusion that Mr. justice Higgins, in affirming equal
pay to men and women in "ambiguous occupations," was not influenced
by the abstract doctrine which I have been, considering, but by the
practical difficulty of preventing men from being competed out of
employment by 6heap female labor. Indeed, the ardent advocate of
"equal pay for equal work" as a supreme and axiomatic principle for
determining the rates of wage for women, ignores the just claim of
the "industrial mother". Of course, the State might endow the
married woman; but the propriety of doing so is not for a judicial
tribunal to consider.
No- one would deny the need for recognising the danger of men
being competed out of employment by cheap female labor. Few
would deny that women workers, whether living at home or not,
should receive at least a living wage for unskilled labor, and should also
receive a secondary wage for skill, &c. But even assuming all this,
the practical difficulties which confronted me when I was asked to apply
the second principle of Mr. Justice Higgins to the facts of industrial
'Economic Journal (March, 19,7) 65.
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life were so disturbing as to call for a brief statement. The first
of these difficulties is that the principle involves an embarrassing
dilemma. In industries in which both men and women find employ-
ment, women either are or are not typically on the same level as
men as far as usefulness to the employer is concerned. If they
are not typically equal to men, then, under normal conditions
of the labor market, they are liable to be excluded from employ-
ments for which they may be well adapted. In other words, under
the conditions suggested, an Industrial Court, while purporting to
confer a boon on women, would be really excluding them from
at least some avenues of employment. On the other hand, in
industries where men and women are approximately of equal value,
then, as a result of the general increase in the wages bill of the
community, the purchasing value of the wages of men would be
affected. The wages bill of the community, as well as any surplus
for profits, comes out of prices. A high rate of wages to women, in
proportion to the number of women affected, means that the bread-
winner with a wife and family to support will contribute as a consumer,
in order to maintain women workers in a far higher standard of liv-
ing than is possible for the man himself, his wife, and children. The
second principle of Mr. Justice Higgins thus involves an embarrass-
ing dilemma. I fear that the existence of the dilemma is seldom
realised. Men and women employees alike are apt to be obsessed by
the doctrine of equal pay for equal work, without considering ultimate
consequences. A cynic might suggest that the men are so confident of
holding their own that they believe that the fixation of equal pay would
practically ensure to men a monopoly of the employments in which they
happen to be engaged. Undoubtedly, however, many men are actuated
by more chivalrous motives. But the motives, bad or good, must be
brought under the cold light of reason. In the case recently before
me Mr. Parsons, K. C., speaking on behalf of the employers, argued
with great cogency, "The mere fact that women are doing a part of the
work hitherto done by men, shows the capacity of women for the
occupations concerned. It is economically unsound to retain men in
an employment, at 'artificial wages', when women are willing to do the
work for 'natural wages'. Men cannot complain if they are driven out
of the field of what has really become women's employment .
To declare that women shall compete only on the terms fixed for a
man's wage is unfair to the public, because such an artificial stipula-
tion must increase the cost of living. . . . There is a danger of
retaining men in work for which they have ceased to be in demand, and
in which they can be retained only by payments of artificial wages to
the injury of many women and the public. . . . As the introduc-
tion of machinery deprived men of some employment, .so may women.
In both cases there are regrettable consequences, but the community
in the long run gains."
REGULATION OF WAGES FOR WOMEN
The use of the term "artificial wages" by the learned counsel has
a relative justification. As I have already implied, the wage for single
men is also artificial; but I need not reiterate the reasons already
stated for this anomaly. It is more important to emphasize the dangers
of levying a tax on male employees generally, in order to give an "arti-
ficial wage" to women. Two things seem reasonably certain. The first
is that there will probably be a substantial increase in the employ-
ment of women in the future. The tendency in this direction before
the war has been accentuated by the war, and will very possibly
be still more accentuated by the conditions following the conclusion of
the war. The second thing is that the material well-being of the
workers as a class depends as much on low prices as upon high wages.6
I do not mean that wages should not increase; I believe and hope that
they will increase. But so far as the workers are concerned, what they
really want is an increase in earning capacity, not merely an increase
in nominal wages. In several cases before this court I have declared
my reluctance to increase wages unless such increase could be taken out
of profits. The principle affirmed by Mr. Justice Higgins would
threaten a wholesale "passing on" in the prices of commodities, and
so a reduction in the purchasing power of nominal wages.
In the second place, the principle of Mr. Justice Higgins, if generally
applied, would act in practice with a strange caprice. The learned
Judge takes the case of fruit-picking. In this, as in most unskilled
industries, what would probably happen would be that, if men were
available, they would be employed, whilst, if they did not happen to be
available, women would be employed, and would be paid at rates of
wage out of all proportion to their needs-the recognised standard of
assessment-and out of all proportion to wages received by women who
are engaged in other occupations which happen to be purely women's
work, and are of certainly equal value from the point of view of the
community.
In the third place, with reference to the broader social aspects of the
question now under consideration, the trend of Mr. Justice Higgins's
second principle, if put into general practice, would be to attract many
women from the occupations which fit them for the life duties which
the majority are called upon to fulfil, into occupations which have no
value as a training for the performance of such duties. Closely asso-
ciated with this aspect of the question is the problem of domestic aid.
The problem has become increasingly important in Australia, among
other reasons, on account of the vital importance to the community of
maintaining the rate of increase of the population. The solution of the
problem would be made increasingly difficult by awarding substan-
tially higher rates for women workers in factories than are now cur-
rent. No doubt there might be a marked improvement in the condi-
Carpenters and Joiners' Case (I9i6-x8) 18 S. A. I. R 172-,78.
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tions of domestic service which have hitherto prevailed; but taking
facts as they are, there is the utmost difficulty, certainly amongst the
working classes and persons of moderate incomes, in obtaining domestic
help adequate to the upbringing of a family of even moderate size.
Hence, in part, the growing sterility of the population-a serious
menace to the future of Australia. If to-day, so many women would
rather work in factories at low wages than assist in domestic service,
what would happen if the wage for women in factories were doubled?
It is an unpopular thing to state nowadays, but it is nevertheless
broadly true, that women's true apprenticeship for her future career is
to be found, not in the workshop or the salesroom, but in some form of
training or apprenticeship directly related to wifehood and mother-
hood. I am fully aware that there are exceptional cases of women who
do not marry, but an Industrial Court has to determine its action by
reference to types rather than exceptions. The real question at issue,
as regard women who do not marry, is not whether they shall not be
paid a living wage with adequate margins for skill, &c., but whether
they shall be paid rates of wages avowedly assessed by reference to the
needs of the bread-winner of a family.
In the fourth place, it might be urged-and indeed I suggested so
much for the consideration of the parties in the course of the hearing of
the recent case-that the apparent object. of awarding men and women
equal minimum rates, namely, the protection of men from unemploy-
ment, might be met, at any rate in many industries, by limiting the
proportion of women to men employed in the particular industry or
grade thereof.
It is easier to find objections to a general principle relating to the rate
of wage for women engaged in ambiguous occupations, than to propose
any alternative scheme which would prove workable in practice, and,
at the same time, reasonable and just in its operation alike to employers,
to men and women employees, and to the community. In point of
-fact it'is impossible to formulate a principle applicable in the case
of ambiguous occupations to which some objections, more or less plau-
sible, could not be urged. Nevertheless, with regard to any principle,
the objections to it must be considered in their cumulative force. The
principle which has been under examination appears to me to be open
-to objections so weighty that I feel it imperative to consider whether it
-would not be possible to formulate any alternative principle or prin-
ciples. I shall begin with a statement of the more important factors
of the problem to be solved. Many of these factors are in the nature
of commonplaces, generally admitted as a matter of form, though apt
to be lost sight of by individuals who are more anxious to justify
cherished preconceptions than to arrive at just conclusions.
(i) The Rights of Women.-(a) To freedom in the choice of
career, and (b) to a fair wage. Neither right, as I shall indicate later,
can be justly interpreted without reference to the good of the com-
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munity. What I wish to emphasize here is that women should not be
treated as a mere means to an end; they are an end in themselves.
Incidentally, I may remark that freedom in the choice of careers
includes freedom to marry, and a right to support when married. The
time may not have arrived when full legislative, administrative, or
judicial recognition can be given to the claims of "the industrial
mother." But Industrial Courts have given some recognition to the
claims when assessing the living wage for men.
(2) The Traditional Organisation of Society.-According to this
organisation, man is, or should be, the bread-winner. In other coun-
tries I have seen women, who should be engaged in domestic duties,
earning the family income, while their husbands have been spending
most of their time in indolence. Happily this is abnormal. Speaking
generally, even as regards single women and single men, established
tradition and morality impose upon the man and not the woman, the
duty to save up for the initial expense of the home. I am aware that
there are, in the traditional organisation of society, evils which an Indus-
trial Court, so far as falls within its province, should seek to combat.
The low wages paid to women workers in some industries may be quoted
as an example. In 1912 the average earnings of adult manual women
workers was assessed in England at 1os. Ioy2 d. per week. Per contra
the duty of men to maintain their homes is a part of the traditional
organisation of society which should be recognized by Industrial
Courts as a general ground for differentiation in wages between men
and women workers. Other grounds, related to the same source,
might be found in the desirability that girls should be encouraged to
receive a sound domestic training (either as a domestic help or in the
home of their parents), and in the undesirability that women should
be encouraged to indulge in a standard of expenditure so high that
marriage may appear to them an intolerable sacrifice. The high wages
which during the war have been paid to some women workers in Eng-
land, have been alleged to act as a deterrent to marriage. If that be so,
it is regrettable from the point of. view of an Industrial Court. It is
for the High Court of Parliament to assume the responsibility of sanc-
tioning social revolutions, such, for example, as (a) authorising women
of a certain income to have children without incurring the respon-
sibility of marital life; (b) releasing men from the responsibility of
maintaining the home; (c) State endowment of motherhood, &c.
(3) That an Industrial Court must take a broad view, dealing with
types or classes rather than individuals, has been so generally recog-
nised that I would hesitate to refer to the matter but for the fact that
I have to address myself to a psychology which is, according to common
repute, generally disposed to argue from the concrete instance. Even
learned counsel in the recent proceedings before me did not escape the
trap into which I should have been led if I ignored the duty to deal
with classes rather than individuals. "A single woman," said Sir Josiah
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Symon, "may have a widowed mother to keep." I will even concede
that she might have a widowed mother-in-law to keep! But the
responsibility can hardly be a ground upon which to proceed in deter-
mining the wages of women workers in general. Doubtless the outlook
of women will in time be broadened under the system of modem educa-
tion, the freer life, and the greater opportunities offered to women in
modem society; but the more advanced woman of to day will freely
admit that her sisters are apt to reason exclusively from concrete
instances. As an example of what I mean, I may refer to the argument
by some women that a single woman should receive as much as a single
man. I have already shown why, on general and particular grounds,
an Industrial Court must award the single man a living wage assessed
by reference to the needs of the married man-grounds of which most
do not apply to single women as a class.
(4) The comparative efficiency of women and men varies in differ-
ent occupations. Sir William Beardmore, President in 1916 of the
Iron and Steel Institute, said -- "When it was found that the demands
of the Government for a greatly accelerated production of shells
required the employment of girls in the shell factory, owing to the
scarcity of skilled workers, these girls in all cases produced more than
double that by thoroughly trained mechanics-members of trade
unions-working the same machines under the same conditions. In the
turning of the shell body the actual output by girls, with the same
machines and working under the same conditions and for an equal
number of hours, was quite double that by trained mechanics. In the
boring of shells the output also was quite double, and in the curving,
waving, and finishing of shell cases quite 12o per cent. more than that
of experienced mechanics." 7 In the course of the hearing of the recerit
case before me, evidence was adduced to show the relative efficiency of
men and women in the printing trade. A witness called on behalf of
the employers deprecated employing women in substitution for men.
The same witness dwelt upon the superior patience of women at routine
work. He said also that women do not stay long enough to justify
their being trained for the more important parts of the trade. I think
it would be dangerous to attach literal importance to the passage cited
from the presidential address of Sir William Beardmore. What
women can do, and do do, in the fine fervour of a war enthusiasm, is
no guide to what they will do under normal conditions. "There are,"
says Miss Rathbone, "in the eyes of most employers certain standing
disadvantages of women's labor which have to be reckoned with.
There is the fact that the law will not allow him to work her at night
nor for overtime, except under rigid restrictions; that her liability to
sickness (in most trades) is rather greater; that he cannot put her to
lift heavy weights or to do odd jobs; that he cannot comfortably swear
'Economic Journal (March, 1g8) 3.
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at her if she is stupid; that, in short, she is a woman, and most
employers, being male, have a 'club' instinct which makes them feel
more at ease with an undiluted male staff. Above all, there is the
overwhelming disadvantage, if the occupation is a skilled one, that she
is liable to go off and get married just as she is beginning to be of some
use."8 On the whole, I incline to the opinion that in most occupations
women are potentially less efficient than men. In part, this may result
from their training, environment, or the methods of industrial organi-
sation which have frequently limited the work of women to an inferior
or routine character. In part, however, the comparative inefficiency
of women in a large number of occupations may be attributed to a
physiological constitution which involves periods of relative inefficiency.
Again, in many industries, the value of an employee is largely depen-
dent upon an ability to cope with periods of exceptional stress. This
ability of men as distinguished from women is not affected by the
physiological conditions just referred to. Again, the value of an
employee to an employer is in part dependent upon whether the
employee regards the employment as a life's career or not. In the
case of men, their occupation is their life's vocation; in the case of
women, their occupation (beyond the domestic sphere) is, in most
cases, transitory. The physiological effect upon the worker need not
be emphasized. "It is," writes Miss Proud, "the uncertainty of a
woman's vocation that forms its chief difficulty. One employer found
that women would gladly attend cooking or housewifery classes when
they knew they would shortly need to cook or keep house. But for
io years or more, from 14 years of age onwards, a factory girl's life-
work is undecided. She usually declines to equip herself fully for
either doubtful alternative. After io years of drifting it is not likely
that she will be perfectly prepared for either. The few years during
which a youth's work is undecided are acknowledged to be difficult, but
they are not universal, and are brief when compared with thele years in
a woman's life. It is not that women are not conscientious; they are
often pathetically so. If there is a dreary monotonous task to be per-
formed, which needs constant and minute attention, it is found that a
woman's service is unsurpassed. It is not that women are not intelli-
gent; individual women have again and again in various branches
proved their worth. It is not that women are physically weak;
individually they may be stronger than individual men, and, at any rate,
physical strength is no longer the greatest factor in industry. Women
are inferiors in the industrial world because they have not decided
(except individually) that they desire to be otherwise, or at least that
they desire to pay in training the. price of efficiency. Whether that
price would be worth paying from a national point of view cannot be
guessed, and there is, on the part of employers, curiously little attempt
'Ibid. (March, 1917) 59.
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to discover the truth in this connection. Where apprenticeship
schemes for girls are introduced, they are on a different plan from those
for boys, and they are hampered by the same difficulty of vocational
uncertainty."
Sex disadvantages are the subject of reference in the judgment ofCussen J.10 Speaking of the rank and file of female workers, partic-
ularly, he said :-"Whatever else is alleged against the employers, it
is not, so far as I am aware, contended that they are not capable of
looking after their own interests, and can it be doubted that if the
results from female clerks were equal to those from male clerks, the
former would have been employed to a much greater extent? Yet
except for special classes of work where also the females received
much lower wages than the males (engaged in other classes of work)
this was not the case. It follows as a corollary, if my view is right,
that if the determination of the Special Board is adhered to, many
females would lose their employment, and, as might have been expected,
evidence was forthcoming that such a result would follow not, perhaps,
in the case of exceptional, but certainly in the case of ordinary
females."
(5) It is obviously the duty of a Judge of an Industrial Court to
avoid regulations which would unduly hamper the industrial progress
of the State. Both employees (male and female) and employers are
concerned in this progress. The figures of the Commonwealth Govern-
ment Statistician go to show that South Australia is not holding her
own in the world of industry as compared with the other States. I
see no reason to question the substantial accuracy of those figures
more especially as they are in accord with common repute. While
some of the figures might be explained by reference to the advantages
enjoyed by Sydney and Melbourne with respect to the proximity of
coal supply, superior marketing facilities, etc., they serve at the same
time to emphasize the need for counterbalancing those advantages as
far as may be practicable, provided a fair standard of wage is main-
tained. Otherwise, while seeming to help the employees, the Court
will really be depriving them of employment. Of course, it is possible
to argue that the State of South Australia should allow its manufac-
Suring industries to drift to other States whilst concentrating its effort
on rural industries. But the argument is one for the High Court of
Parliament rather than for the Industrial Court. The exact applica-
tion of the "preservation of industry" to the question of the rates of
wage for women can only be made in relation to particular industries.
But one general principle emerges -Assuming as axiomatic a living
wage plus margins for skill, etc., data as to existing wages i'n one State
have to be submitted to careful analysis before they can be accepted
'Welfare Work, 8o-81.
10 xg Argus L. Rep. 146.
REGULATION OF WAGES FOR WOMEN
as a standard for another State. While they may be too low (having
in view the potential economy of high wages) they may also be so high
that their imposition might imperil the industry, and inferentially
prejudice employers and employees alike. Before a Court accepts the
standard of wage set in another State, it should be informed of the
relative conditions of the industry in the two States, the relative cost
of living, &c.
(6) Closely allied with the question of the conservation of industry
is the-question of how to regulate industry so as to secure the maximum
production at the minimum costs of production. This latter question
can wcarcely be overlooked by Industrial Courts, even in normal times.
But the times are not normal. "The world's poverty as a result of the
war," said Mr. Parsons, K. C., in the recent case before me, "is so
great that the world's work must be done at the lowest cost consistent
with securing to the worker his or her reasonable needs, and a just
secondary wage." Of course the desired result can only be attained
by the co-operation of many agencies, including public and private.
But it suggests, inter alia, industrial regulation along lines which would
tend to promote the utilisation of all thd available forces of the commu-
nity in the work of production. Even before the war, the tendency of
social progress was towards the elimination of the "social drone."
The war has accentuated this tendency. When the war is over, finan-
cial obligations which have been incurred will impose on all classes of
the community a new standard of efficiency. So far as women are
concerned, the fact has a particular application inasmuch as in the past,
prior to the period of marriage, a large number of women have neither
contributed to industry, nor learnt domestic economy in a home. A
further application may be found in the kind of work women are
allowed to do. "In industry," writes Miss Rathbone, "the outbreak
of the war found the women workers confined almost entirely, except
in a few occupations traditionally their own, to the lowest, most ill-
paid, and unskilled occupations. The barriers that kept them out of
the skilled trades were for the most part unrecognised by law, but they
were almost completely effective, being built up partly of tradition,
partly of trade union regulations, but mainly of the sex exclusiveness
in which employers and employed made common cause. Against these
barriers the women's movement had beaten itself for half a century
in vain, but within two years the necessities of the war have broken
them down-by no means completely, but to such an extent that it is
plain that if re-erected they will have to be based frankly upon the
desire of the male to protect himself from competition, and no longer
upon the alleged incapacity of the female to compete.""
I am not holding a brief for that miserable "economy," if economy
it may be called, which consists in "watching the pennies while the
"Economic Journal (March, i917) 55-56.
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pound notes are flying out of the windows." There are to be found
amongst us to-day some who seem to be obsessed by what they call
"retrenchment." It was publicly stated the other day that the cost of
Governments in Australia was 18ooooo per annum. It does not fall
within my province to discuss whether this is too high a price to pay
for democratic institutions. I content myself with the remark that in
the same year the cost of the Sydney strike to the Commonwealth was
estimated to exceed £io,oooooo. I state these figures here because I
feel that it is seldom realised that true economy should be sought in
increased output (with all that increased output means), stability,
co-operation, reasonable wages, etc. Sound national economy embraces
the recognition of the need for securing such a return for work,
whether mental or physical, as will maintain the worker in health and
efficiency, and stimulate his or her ambition. The realisation of the
fact, in its bearing upon maximum production at lowest cost of pro-
duction, leads to the conclusion that lowest cost of production should
be sought for, less in low rates of wages than in increased skill in the
management, and in increased efficiency of the worker. But, whatever
the rates of wage may be, a relatively low rate to women as compared
with men is not necessarily open to the objection that it subsidises the
employer at the expense of the employee. No doubt, especially in older
lands, this objection is occasionally, and in some industries, justified.
But in proportion as the price of commodities is controlled by active
competition or by the intelligent supervision of public authorities, the
subsidy, if so it may be called, goes, not to the employers, but to the
community.
(7) Closely related to the matters just considered, is the prevention
of unemployment either of men or women. Primarily, the problem of
unemployment is one for the Legislature or the Administration; but
an Industrial Court ought not to increase the difficulties of the Legis-
lature or Administration in dealing with the problem. The South Aus-
tralian Act of 1912 precludes the Court from fixing lower than the
living wage. But a judicial declaration of a living wage has no
significance for those who cannot secure employment. So far as men
are concerned, there is the obvious danger of their being driven out
of employment by women working at a lower wage. On the other
hand, so far as women are concerned, there is the obvious danger of
excluding them from employments for which they are quite adapted,
but not quite so efficient, as men, by fixing the same minimum rates
for both men and women. As a woman writer already quoted
remarks :-"The attempt to establish strict arithmetical equality
between them goes further than is necessary to protect the men against
unfair competition, and really weights the scale against the women."
Again, speaking of women, there may be a class or classes with regard
to whom it would be not in their own interests for the Court to
prescribe even a living wage for women-a subject to which I shall
return later.
REGULATION OF WAGES FOR WOMEN
(8) The concept of justice, in an Industrial Court and Civil Courts
respectively, varies. In Civil Courts, the Judge normally concentrates
his thought upon the question of effecting "justice between the parties."
In Industrial Courts, the Judge is impelled to take a wider range;
he has to consider how a particular award may effect the parties in
the particular industry, the class interests of employers and employees
at large, and the welfare of the community. What I wish to stress
here is that the good of the community is the supreme factor in the
formulation of principles by an Industrial Court. I almost hesitate to
speak of the "good of the community" because that expression has
been so often used to serve the purpose or interest of a class or
individual. Every conceivable condition of, or change in, social rela-
tions is alleged by one person or another, to be justified on the plea of
the good of the community," when, in reality, the person has in his
mind only the interests of a class, or, it may be, even an individual.
A great principle has been prostituted to sinister ends. Obviously, since
the community is made up of classes and individuals, the considera-
tion of the good of the community must involve a consideration of
the interests of classes and individuals. But there is a wide gulf which
divides, or may divide, the purely class interest and that good of the
community as a whole to which an Industrial Court must defer as the
ultimate essential. The right of individuals or of classes must be
defined in terms which are in harmony with the good of the community.
One particular application of the *formula that the good of the com-
munity is sovereign is found in the claims of that unrepresented party,
the purchaser of commodities. Another application is that so long as
men have "families to keep," and so long as there is no State endow-
ment of motherhood, the male employee is entitled to an allowance by
way of extra wages in order that he may meet the expenses of his home.
The rate of wage must include the claims of the "industrial mother,"
which, however inadequately recognised in the past, are not less deserv-
ing of recognition than the claim of the unskilled woman worker.
Other applications of the sovereignty of the common good might be
given. For the present it is sufficient to insist on the sovereignty as
a fact which ought to control an Industrial Court in the formulation of
principles. In interpreting the good of the community, the Court has
not the same freedom as the Legislature; but, subject to existing law,
it has a grave responsibility in this relation. The responsibility is
especially apparent when the Court is called on to state principles of
such far-reaching importance as those which relate to the regulation of
the rates of wage for women workers. Of course it would be possible
to give an award without any analysis of principles, to state results
without their justification. But such a course is shirking responsibili-
ties. Further, the Court may err in its principles. If it does, the clear
statement of them enables the High Court of Parliament to vary the
principles as regards future cases.
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SUMMARY OF FACTORS.
I do not pretend for a moment that my enumeration of factors is
complete; but it indicates at once the more important things that have
to be borne in mind, and at the same time, the extreme difficulty of
arriving at just conclusions. I wish particularly to emphasize the
danger which I am afraid is very commonly exemplified, of being
obsessed by one or the other of the factors, to the exclusion of the
others. That is the way to easy conclusions; but it is seldom the way
to just conclusions. The factors must be viewed collectively if we are
to avoid the bogs into which we would be led if we failed to observe ajust sense of proportion. I now proceed to state the resulting con-
clusions to which I personally am led. It will be understood that I
am only concerned with minimum, not maximum rates, that I speak of
industries generally rather than of any one industry, and -that I make
no pretence to supersede supply and demand which must necessarily
operate in favor of the worker, according to the state of the labor
market.
THE LIVING WAGE FOR WOMEN.
Two questions arise for consideration :-(a) Are women workers
entitled to a living wage? (b) If so, what should be the amount? As
regards the first question I was referred in the recent case to a decision
of the New South Wales Arbitration Court in I916.12 In the last men-
tioned case, Edmunds J., after confering with Heydon J., refused to.
enunciate as a general principle that every adult female worker is
entitled to a minimum wage based upon the cost of living. The learned
Judge held that the reason upon which the Court deduced the principle
of the living wage for males was an inference from the Industrial
Arbitration Act, and was not applicable in the case of women workers.
The South Australian Industrial Arbitration Act of 1912, however,(section 22) expressly stipulates that the .Court shall not award less
than a living wage; and the section relating to the living wage applies
equally to women as to men. I am aware that there are, as a matter
of fact, industries or callings in which the majority of women employed
are not in receipt of a living wage, and who, if awarded a living wage,
would lose rather than gain. I can only say with regard to such cases
that it would be proper to determine whether it was in the interests
of the parties and the public to make an award at all. It might well
prove, in some isolated cases, that women would prefer, when the issue
was plainly set before them, to incur the disadvantage of a prevailing
wage, or to accept some compromise between such prevailing wage
and a true living wage, rather than run the risk of unemployment if
that low rate were substantially increased. If such a case should come
before me, I should feel it incumbent upon me to place the issues fairly
(1916) I5 N. S. W., A. R. 453.
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before the parties so that they could determine the better course to
pursue. If they chose not to insist upon an award of the Court, I
should need very strong reasons to induce me to proceed with the hear-
ing. Under section 21 (i.) of the Industrial Arbitration Act of 1912,
the Court has power to dismiss any dispute or matter or refrain from
hearing or from determining a dispute or matter if it appears that the
dispute or matter is trivial, or that, in the public interest, further pro-
ceedings by the Court are not necessary or desirable.
If, -then, we assume that women are legally entitled to a living wage,
the question arises as to what that living wage for women should be.
Applying the statutory definition, it might at first appear that the living
wage for women should vary not merely according to locality, but also
according to the industry concerned. If, for example, it is shown
that all women employed in a particular industry live at home with
their parents, it is arguable that the living wage should not be as high as
in an industry in which all the women live away from home. Mr.
Justice Higgins, however, with reference to cases before the Common-
wealth Court, uses without qualification the words "A woman or girl
with a comfortable home cannot be left to underbid in wages other
women who are less fortunate." Personally, I know of no industry
in which the fact that a women does or does not live at home is a
necessary qualification for her employment. The mere fact that all the
women employed in a particular industry live in the homes of their
parents, would not of itself prove a necessity for their doing so, or,
that the custom, if so it might be called, was fixed and immovable.
Other reasons enforce the argument to which Mr. Justice Higgins
gives terse expression :-(i) While the question of value of work done
cannot be accepted as an ultimate basis for the definite fixation of
wages, it need not be wholly ignored. If men receive for unskilled
labor "X" per day, and if "Y" per day be the amount allocated to the
male worker on the supposition that a man is or may become a bread-
winner of a family, then "X..-"Y" is a symbol which goes some way
to indicate what a woman may claim a moral right to (living at home
or not). (2) The adult woman worker who lives at home with her
parents is under a moral duty to contribute a share in the upkeep of
the family, and an Industrial Court ought not to fix the living wage
for woman at a figure which would render the adequate performance
of this duty difficult or impossible.
THE MINIMUM WAGE FOR WOMEN.
The minimum wage for women in an industry or grade must be fixed
by reference to circumstances, conditions, &c., of that industry or
grade. The living wage is a matter primarily of actuarial calculation.
The minimum wage in a particular industry, though it must not be
less than a living wage, may be fixed at some higher figure on various
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grounds. Of these grounds, the most obvious is skill. In this connec-
tion I think that a useful distinction may be drawn between the primary
minimum (applicable to the whole of an industry) and the secondary
minimum (applicable to the several parts or grades of an industry).
In assessing the. proper marginal difference between the living (or a
primary minimum wage, as the case may be) and the secondary mini-
mum, regard should be paid to custom (ascertainable by reference to
usage in the state or elsewhere) or to rates of wage in kindred occu-
pations, or to such other standards or considerations (including the
fact of male competition) as may be appropriate in the particular class.
In an industry where both men and women are engaged, prima facie,
the minimum rates for women might be expressed algebraically by
reference to the minimum rates for men. Supposing a living wage
for a man to be "X," and the minimum wage for labor in the partic-
ular industry to be "X" plus io per cent., while the minimum wage
for skilled labor in the same industry in a particular grade to be "X"
plus 20 per cent., then the just remuneration for women would seem
to be (supposing the living wage for a woman living apart from her
parents to be "Y") "Y" plus IO per cent. and "Y" plus 20 per cent.
respectively.
It will be apparent that the formula just indicated can only be taken
as a rule of prima facie value. In the case of industries where it is
desirable that men should be kept in employment, and there is a real
danger of their being competed out of employment by women labor, a
very difficult situation arises. It has been argued that it would not
be to the interests of the community that men should be kept in employ-
ment (if women were capable of doing the work) at the price of pay-
ing women a man's minimum. On the other hand it is necessary to
remember the reasons, some of them very cogent, why women should
not be encouraged to do workwhich normally and properly is done by
men, at the cost of creating unemployment among the men. I suggest
that with respect to any industry or grade, where the prima facie
formula above indicated is challenged, evidence should be adduced to
show that it is desirable, having in view the interests of all parties
and of the community, that men should be retained in that industry
-or grade, even though such retention might involve some departure
from the formula in question. Where such evidence is satisfactory,
there are several alternatives open to an Industrial Court:-(i) To
fix the same wage for women as for men; (2) to fix a ratio wage
where it is proved that the average woman is not of equal value to the
employer; (3) to exclude women; (4) to accept the prima facie mode
of assessment, but to limit the proportion of women who may be
employed by any particular employer in any particular industry or
grade.
In choosing between the alternatives suggested, the factors to which
I have referred, and all the conditions of the industry under adjudi-
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cation, must be considered cumulatively. The task of choosing may
often be one of extreme delicacy and difficulty. The legitimate claims
of women, both to a free choice of career and to a fair wage for work
done, have to be reconciled and harmonised with the like claims of
men. Women must not be denied a living wage in any case; but apart
from this, and apart from their just claim to marginal differences, the
obligation is cast upon an Industrial Court to see that women are not
doomed to occupy the unenviable roll of blacklegs in the sphere of
essentially male occupations. In the discharge of this obligation, the
Court will have necessarily to sacrifice that will-o'-the-wisp of uni-
formity of wage to women workers. The difficulty of securing justice
to wpmen's claim to a fair wage can only be harmonised with the just
claims of the community, the employers, and the men wage earners, if
we face the problem as it presents itself in the varying conditions of
different industries. Beyond what I have already said, I do not at
present suggest any further general rule as to the choice between the
various alternatives indicated where the Court has to deal with mini-
mum rates of wage for women in occupations in which men are also
employed, and in which it is desirable that men should continue to be
employed. We live in a progressive age; and an Industrial Court
has to beware of what I may describe as the premature crystallisation
of principle, lest such crystallisation should have the practical effect
of impeding instead of assisting industrial stability in the future.
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES.
I. All women workers are entitled to a living wage and to a reason-
able addition to that wage by way of marginal differences.
2. The living wage for men must include the claims of the "indus-
trial mother," and the home over which she presides.
3. In fixing the primary minimum wage for women in an "ambigu-
ous occupation," regard must be paid to the question whether it is
necessary in the interests of male workers and the community, to pre-
vent men from being competed out of employment by cheap female
labor. Where it is proved to be necessary-and the proof must depend
upon the evidence adduced with respect to the particular industry
under adjudication-then the Court should resort to one or other of
the various alternatives indicated.
PROGRESS: SUPPLY AND DEMAND.
I have enddavored to frame the broad outlines of a scheme for deal-
ing with the vexed question of the relative rates of wage for men and
women. I may add that I am not so vain as to imagine that the scheme
I have submitted is open to no objection. As I have already suggested,
it is impossible to give full effect to all of the various factors of the
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problem. What an Industrial Court has to do is to avoid at all costs
the danger of obsession by particular factors. It has to look at all the
factors of the problem together, and harmonise and reconcile them as
best it can. I should like also to add that if in particular cases an
Industrial Court errs in its solution of the vexed problem under con-
sideration, to some extent at least, its errors may be rectified by supply
and demand. An Industrial Court does not impose maximum wages.
Given the minimum fixed by an order or an award, it is surely a paying
proposition for employers to pay higher than the minimum to the more
competent workmen in order to retain their services, and to stimulate
the less competent. As regards a woman, whatever wages this Court
may fix are minimum rates which leave to individual women full and
free right to refuse to accept employment save at some higher rate.
The law of South Australia prohibits the lock-out and the strike. Sub-
ject to this prohibition, the competition between employers for the
services of men and women is not designed to be interfered with.
Even if the South Australian Court imposes a minimum wage for
women who do a certain class of work, that would not prevent individ-
ual women from insisting on a higher rate as a condition to accepting
employment. To what extent women would be able to avail them-
selves of this right would largely depend, of course, upon the state of
the labor market. I am aware that, in the past, "supply and demand"
in relation to wages has been anathema to many reformers. It has
been looked upon as a pretext for sweating and similar evils; but the
principles which I have formulated, in stipulating that women should
receive at least a living wage, and a minimum wage for skill, &c.,
should remove an objection which has been felt, and naturally and prop-
erly felt, to the unrestricted operation of supply and demand in rela-
tion to labor. In the recent case I was referred to the fee received
by women doctors as an argument for equal pay for the sexes. But
the wages, salaries, earnings, or fees of women doctors are regulated
by conditions over which the South Australian Court has no cogni-
zance. Those conditions may at some future date be applicable to
women workers generally. If this should happen, it would amount to
a social revolution. But an Industrial Court must have regard to
txisting conditions; and I may express the hope that the time will not
come when women workers in the field of industry should ignore the
claims of the "industrial mother," who has to keep the family going
out of the husband's wages.
